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Introduction
Recent quantitative economic studies by Dutch scholars suggest that conscious 
government policy succeeded in diminishing the scourge of opium in the Netherlands 
Indies. These studies are in stark contrast to qualitative research by American scholars, 
which suggests the dominance of the profit motive in the implementation of 
government policy toward opium. In this paper, it is shown that the quantitative 
evidence, when analyzed in historical context, supports the American view. I will 
dem onstrate, in particular, that the Opium Regie was an extremely lucrative 
government enterprise, and that, contrary to its stated aims, the government did little 
to use the profits of this enterprise to stamp out the opium problem. In the final 
analysis, Indonesia has the Great Depression, and not the Opium Regie, to thank for 
the decline of opium consumption in the years prior to her independence.
The Origins of the Opium Regie
The Opium Regie was a centralized system for the processing, distribution, and 
sale of processed opium in the Netherlands Indies. The origins of the Regie lie in the
1 Support from the Asian Studies Program at the University of Pittsburgh, comments on different parts of 
this research from Anne Foster, James Rush, seminar participants at the University of Pittsburgh, Carnegie 
Mellon University, and the RAND Corporation, and the research assistance of Miranda Beshara and 
Mahendra Lawoti are gratefully acknowledged.
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1880s.2 Prior to this time, the government of the Netherlands Indies had used a system 
of revenue farms to earn revenue from the sale of opium.3 Regional monopoly rights for 
the processing and sale of government-supplied raw opium had been auctioned to the 
highest bidder. During the 1880s, however, the Netherlands Indies economy 
experienced a severe recession.4 This recession had a damaging effect on the operation 
of the opium revenue farms, especially in Java. A number of opium farms were unable 
to pay their dues to the government, a situation which led to declines in government 
revenue. This partly motivated the subsequent outcry against abuses associated with 
the opium farm system, including perceived increases in the level of indebtedness of 
opium consumers at the hands of Chinese moneylenders.5
As a result, a coalition of interests developed, which was strong enough to initiate 
a thorough re-evaluation of the system of manufacture and sale of opium in the 
Netherlands Indies. This coalition consisted of two groups. The first advocated the 
integration of the processing and distribution of opium into a single government-owned 
entity. The motivation was the appropriation of profits, which had hitherto been 
garnered by the now-wealthy Chinese opium farmers, but which would now accrue to 
the government. The second group had humanitarian concerns. Members hoped, 
somewhat naively, that by taking control of the processing and sale of opium and 
eliminating the opium farms, the government would soon eliminate the consumption of 
opium and the accompanying problems of addiction and indebtedness. The 
convergence of fiscal and ethical interests led to the creation of the Opium Regie. In the 
context of the history of Indonesia, the anti-opium -farm  movement was a 
manifestation of a broader change in public opinion among the Dutch leading up to the 
Ethical period (so called because it led to the creation of a variety of institutions that 
were supposed to improve the condition of Indies subjects, and thereby to correct 
perceived injustices). The anti-opium-farm movement had the support of European 
elements of the plantation and business community and of those Dutch who had 
genuine humanitarian concerns. It was resisted by a number of opium-farmers of 
Chinese descent, who had become powerful and wealthy in the business, and by some 
European planters who resented the new government presence close to their estates.
2 This introduction follows James R. Rush, Opium to Java: Revenue Farming and Chinese Enterprise in 
Colonial Indonesia, 1860-1910 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 217-41, the most 
systematically researched summary to date of the debate that led to the formation of the Opium Regie and its 
goals.
3 For discussions of revenue farmers and farming in Java, see, for example, Howard Dick, "Oei Tiong Ham," 
in The Rise and Fall of Revenue Farming: Business Elites and the Emergence of the Modem State in Southeast 
Asia, eds. John Butcher and Howard Dick (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 272-280, and 
James Rush, Opium to Java.
4 This recession was partly related to the sugar crisis of 1884-1885. See P. Creutzberg, Changing Economy 
in Indonesia: A Selection of Statistical Source Material from the Early 19th Century up to 1940, vol. 4: Rice 
Prices (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), p. 28, for a brief account of the sugar crisis and its impact on 
the economy.
5 The term "Chinese," imprecise as it is in this context, will be used out of convenience to refer to people of 
Chinese descent. An interesting parallel trend in popular opinion against opium developed in the US at this 
time. See T. D. Crothers, "Some New Studies of the Opium Disease," Journal of the American Medical 
Association XVIII (January-June 1892): 227-33, for an informed (by the standards of the time) discussion of 
the subject.
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The Opium Regie involved a complete overhaul of the system of processing and 
sale of opium. This included, first, the replacement of small local opium-farm factories 
with a single modern central factory in Batavia. This factory produced opium of 
standard quality, thereby eliminating the problem of adulteration. The first factory 
was built in 1893, only to be replaced by a larger factory in 1901 as the scope of the 
Regie expanded. With the major exception of raw opium destined for the government 
factory in Batavia, the import of opium was banned, and government resources were 
invested in enforcing the ban. Second, the staff members of the local, privately run 
opium farms were replaced with local bureaucrats. Third, the coordination of 
processing and distribution of opium was brought under the supervision of a central 
bureau within the Finance Department. The regional distribution network of the Regie 
consisted, at its hub, of a regional depot, run by a European, and a comprehensive 
network of regional official retail stores. Interestingly, and seemingly contrary to the 
stated aim of reducing opium consumption in Java, the Regie operated at least as 
many—and most likely, more—stores than were in operation during the opium farm 
era.6 The opium that was purchased at these stores could then be taken to an opium 
den where, for a small fee, the smoker would receive the equipment and a place in 
which to smoke. In effect, the Opium Regie involved the replacement of a lucrative and 
powerful Chinese business with a lucrative and more powerful government business. 
With a master-stroke, the Netherlands Indies authorities had eliminated an expensive 
(in terms of profits foregone by the treasury) system of Chinese-run processing and 
distribution to integrate the entire opium sector into one large government-run 
enterprise. The Opium Regie was first introduced in Madura in 1894. By 1903, the 
Regie was in force across Java, and by 1914, it had spread throughout the Netherlands 
Indies.
The Importance of the Opium Regie to the Netherlands Indies Budget
As Table 1 shows (see below), the Opium Regie contributed significantly to the 
Netherlands Indies budget. In monetary terms, revenue from opium ranged between 
32.6 and 52.6 million Guilders7 over the period 1914-1929. Excluding the years 1920- 
1922, this revenue fluctuated within a steady band of about ten million Guilders. In 
percentage terms, however, the importance of revenues from opium relative to the 
entire budget declined steadily over this period, from 13.5 percent in 1914 to 5.3 
percent in 1929.8 This was due to increasing government penetration into the rapidly 
expanding Netherlands Indies economy, which generated large amounts of revenue, 
directly or indirectly, from newer sectors of the economy.9 Although the relative decline
6 See James Rush, Opium to java, p. 220.
7 These figures are not adjusted for inflation.
8 For comparable figures for other colonies in Southeast Asia, see Anne Foster, "Prohibition as Superiority: 
Policing Opium in South-East Asia, 1898-1925," The International History Review, XXII.,2 (June 2000): 256.
9 See Column 3 of Table 1. The newer sectors include the by-then booming rubber sector, and the oil and 
mining sectors.
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Table 1: Contribution of the Opium Regie to the Government Budget
Y ear
Opium
Revenue*
Total
Revenue^
Opium % of 
Total
Opium 
Profits (71/
7c as % of 
Opium Rev.
1914 35.0 281 .7 13.5 26 .7 76
1915 32.6 309 .7 11.2 25 .2 77
1916 35.3 343.1 10.8 28.4 80
1917 38.2 360.1 11.4 30 .4 80
1918 38.8 399.7 10.2 30.1 78
1919 42.5 543.1 8.2 33.2 78
1920 53.6 756.4 7.5 41 .6 78
1921 53.3 791.8 7.1 42.1 79
1922 44.2 752.6 6 .2 34.5 78
1923 37.6 650 .4 6.1 30.1 80
1924 35.3 717 .9 5.1 28.1 80
1925 36.6 753.8 5.2 28 .7 78
1926 37.7 807.9 5.2 29.1 77
1927 40.6 779.1 5.7 31.4 77
1928 42.8 835.9 5.7 34.6 81
1929 40.9 848.5 5.3 32 .7 80
1930 34.5 755.6 5.3 27.1 79
1931 25.3 652.0 4 .6 19.0 75
1932 17.3 501.8 4.5 12.3 71
1933 12.7 460 .6 3.7 8.6 68
1934 11.1 455 .2 3 .2 7 .2* 65*
1935 9.5 466 .7 2 .6 6 .1* 64*
1936 8.9 537.8 2 .2 5 .7* 64*
1937 11.5 575 .4 2.5 7 .7* 67*
1938 11.9 597.1 2.6 8.0* 67*
1939 11.5 663 .4 1.7 8 .6* 75*
1940 11.7 N .A N.A 8.5* 72*
Sources: For opium, the source data are Dutch East Indies Opiumregie, Vers lag betreffende den Dienst der 
Opiumregie (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1915-1933) and Dutch East Indies Opium- en Zoutregie, Verslag betreffende 
de Opium- en Zoutregie en de Zoutwinning (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1934-1940), henceforth referred to as the 
Opium Reports. For total revenue, the source data are P. Creutzberg, Changing Economy in Indonesia: A Selection 
of Statistical Source Material from the Early 19th Century up to 1940. Volume 2: Public Finance 1816-1939, (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), p.43-44. The latter source contains data only until 1939.
^n millions of current (i.e., not adjusted for inflation) Guilders.
*These figures are derived from the combined accounts of the Opium and Salt Regie. They were computed by 
subtracting from opium revenue all elements of cost which were totally or partially attributable to the opium section 
of the Opium and Salt Regie. The numbers, therefore, underestimate the profitability of opium.
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in opium revenues over this sixteen-year period was substantial, the 5 percent share in 
1929 was still important for a single activity.
The onset of the crash of 1929, which initiated the Great Depression, brought with 
it a precipitous drop in opium revenue. Between that year and 1936, when the 
economy began to pull out of the Depression, revenues shrank further, from 34.6 to 8.9 
million Guilders, and the decline in the importance of opium revenue in the government 
budget continued. As the economy emerged from its slump after 1936, revenues 
increased to over eleven million Guilders and remained at this level until the beginning 
of the Second World War.
Throughout the years for which data are available, one fact stands out above the 
rest. The Opium Regie was extremely profitable. In the pre-Depression years, between 
76 percent and 80 percent of the opium revenue was profit (see Column 6 in Table 1). 
In other words, for every Guilder of cost incurred by the Regie, it made between three 
and four Guilders in profit! This amounted to a sizable annual windfall for the 
Netherlands Indies government. Even in the worst years of the Depression, the 
government was claiming fully 64 percent of its opium revenues as profit. In an 
enterprise as profitable as this, it is not at all inconceivable that the government would 
have lacked the will to reduce opium consumption. This raises the important question 
of the intentions of the government toward the opium enterprise.
Opium Consumption and Policy Responses, 1914-1940
The most detailed data on the Opium Regie pertain to the period beginning in 1914, 
when the government became the exclusive legal processor of imported raw opium.10 
Figure 1 (below) is a plot of sales of opium between 1914 and 1940. Two episodes of 
decline are visible. The first occurred in 1920-1923, and the second, in 1929-1935. Both 
can be explained by economic events whose origins were entirely external to the Opium 
Regie.
The first drop in consumption occurred in 1920-1923. This drop was caused by a 
general rise in prices, which was accompanied by an increase in the price of opium, 
from 24.97 to 30.00 Guilders per thail between 1920 and 1921 in Java and Madura, 
and, more gradually, from 17.02 to 24.36 Guilders per thail between 1920 and 1923 in 
the Outer Islands.11 The rise in the price of opium was motivated at least in part by a 
rise in the cost of the main raw material at the time, Bengal opium, from 33.96 to 38.90 
Guilders per kilogram between 1918 and 1920.12 In comparison to other goods,
10 See W. L. Korthals Altes, Changing Economy in Indonesia: A Selection of Statistical Source Material from 
the Early 19th Century up to 1940, vol. 15: Prices (non-rice) 1814-1940 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1994), p. 143.
11 For details of the general price rise, see P. Creutzberg, Rice Prices, p. 29, and W. L. Korthals Altes, Prices 
(non-rice), p. 18. For opium prices, see W. L. Korthals Altes, Prices (non-rice), p. 142. Prior to reporting 
weights in grams and kilograms (the 1938-1940 editions of the Opium Reports), the system of recording 
involved the weights mata, thail, and kali. The conversions were 100 mala =  1 thail = 38.6 grams, and 16 thail 
= 1 kati. The currency followed the decimal system, with 100 cents = 1 Guilder for the entire period.
12 These data are obtained from Dutch East Indies Department van Financien, Opiumfabriek, jaarverslag 
(Weltevreden: Landsdrukkerij, various). This point will be discussed in more detail in a subsequent section.
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Figure 1: Sales of Regie Opium, 1914-1940
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Figure 1a: Seized Contraband Opium, 1915-1940*
Raw Opium 
Contraband
Processed 
Contraband Regie
Processed 
Contraband Non­
regie
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however, the price of opium rose less, actually making it cheaper in "real" terms.13 It 
must therefore be concluded that opium consumption fell not because of a rise in the 
money-denominated price of opium, but because of the larger rise in the general price 
level, which reduced the overall purchasing ability of subjects. During these crisis 
years, consumers substituted smuggled opium for legal Regie opium, as evidenced by 
the spike in seizures (see Figure la, above) of contraband opium in the years following 
the price rise.14 The Regie responded to this threat by relaxing its stringent licensing 
policy with respect to the sale of opium in 1927. This made it easier for users, 
especially in the Outer Islands, which were more susceptible to smuggling, to purchase 
and use Regie opium. These two measures, the decrease in the "real" price of opium 
and the relaxation of the licensing poicy, helped the gradual recovery of sales until the 
onset of the Great Depression in 1929.
The second drop in consumption occurred between 1929 and 1935, the years of the 
Great Depression. During this time, the Regie held the price it had been charging since 
1921 in Java constant, at thirty Guilders per thail. The price was also relatively stable 
in the Outer Islands. Figure 2 (below) contains plots of both sets of prices. As the 
prices of other goods fell sharply, causing the incomes of most Indies subjects to fall in 
money-denominated terms, opium became increasingly expensive in "real" terms, or in 
comparison to other items.15 Figure 2a (below), which contains a plot of the "real" 
price of opium for the Chinese, shows that, in terms of purchasing power, the price of 
opium more than doubled during the Great Depression.16 Ironically, then, it was the 
inaction of the Regie in the face of the Depression that led to the drop in consumption. 
To the resulting decline, tire government responded, somewhat belatedly, by cutting the 
price of opium in 1936 in Java and Madura (Figures 2 and 2a). This had the effect of 
jump-starting consumption,17 but the beginning of the recovery of the Opium Regie was 
abruptly halted when the Japanese invaded the Netherlands Indies in 1942.
Because the data for consumption in the Depression years are more detailed than 
those for the period prior to 1923, a number of interesting phenomena are revealed in 
the responses of Indies opium users to this second crisis. The first noticeable 
development is the increase in seizures of contraband opium. In contrast to the spike in 
seizures of the mid-1920s, which consisted mostly of processed opium, the seizures of 
the Great Depression contained a much larger component of raw opium (Figure la). 
This was the result of the inability of smokers to purchase the refined and more 
expensive processed smuggled substitute. A second set of consequences of the
13 In standard economic analysis, the nominal or money-denominated price of a good is considered to have 
little meaning— consumption is always modeled as being a function of the "real" price of the good.
14 While this spike could also have been driven by increased anti-smuggling enforcement, to the extent that 
the stable expenditures on enforcement are an indicator, enforcement activity remained fairly constant over 
this period.
15 A key feature of the Great Depression in the Netherlands Indies was the accompanying deflation, or fall 
in the general price level (or cost of living). For detailed statistics on this deflation, see Departement van 
Economische Zaken, Prijzen, Indexcijfers en Wisselkoersen op Java 1913-1937 (Batavia: Centraal Kantoor 
voor de Statistiek, 1938, Mededeelingen van het Centraal Kantoor voor de Statistiek, No. 146), especially 
pp. 17-58. The same phenomenon occurred in the US during the Depression.
16 The plot of the "real" price for the indigenous users looks very similar to that for the Chinese.
17 Opium consumption rose 31.9 percent between 1936 and 1937.
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Figure 2: Nominal* Opium Price, 1914-1940
Year
—♦ —Java and Madura Nominal Opium Price —B — Outer Islands Nominal Opium Price
*Not adjusted for inflation.
Source: W.L. Korthals Altes, Changing Economy in Indonesia: A Selection o f Statistical Source Material from the Early 19th Century up to 1940. 
Volume 15: Prices (non-rice) 1814-1940 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), Table 3H, p.142.
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Figure 2a: Real Opium Prices in Java and Madura, 1921-1939*
—• —Java and Madura Opium Real Price, Indigenous - * - J a v a  and Madura Opium Real Price, Chinese
*This plot is an index of the real (inflation-adjusted) price of opium, with the real price in the benchmark year of 1921 set to 100. Price 
levels were obtained from J.J. Polak, The National Income of the Netherlands Indies, 1921-1939 (New York: Netherlands and 
Netherlands Indies Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943), Table 16.2, p.51a. Price level data were not available for the 
years prior to 1921 and after 1939.
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Depression relates to a large literature on the behavioral aspects of addiction in general 
and the consumption of opiates in particular. The following section contains a 
discussion of some of these.
The Great Depression and the Behavior of Opium Users
The fallout of the Depression included the havoc it wreaked on opium smokers. 
Table 2 (below) shows the data on patients hospitalized on account of opium  
addiction. While these figures only began to appear in the Opium Reports in 1932, they 
show a steep decline in the number of patients in the hospital system in the early 
1930s. The percentages in Column 4 of Table 2 show that the patient-load was roughly 
twice as large in 1932 as it was in the post-Depression years of 1937 and later. This is 
an indication of the effect of the Depression, and of the fact that it was receding by the 
mid-1930s. The essence of these figures is captured in Van Otterloo's account of the 
consequences of opium consumption for users during the Great Depression:
The bond with opium naturally has all sorts of consequences, the foremost 
being financial:
T. T. L. from Weltevreden stated, on September 24,1929, that he has a 
family, with a wife and two children. He smokes six mata18 [of opium] per day. 
His total daily income is 2.80 Guilders. The opium costs 1.80 Guilders. He must 
support his family with the remaining one Guilder. And the situation in which 
such families live can be even more unfavorable:
O. L. from Batavia smokes 15 mata of opium per day. This costs him 4.50 
Guilders. That leaves him 50 cents per day for living expenses.19
Given the total number of opium users, the number of patients handled by the 
hospitals is minuscule. There is a good reason for this. Van Otterloo, in his typology of 
opium smokers, mentions three stages in the experience of the opium smoker.20 It is 
evident that the hospitals were handling, for the most part, the small fraction of opium 
smokers who were in the third stage of consumption. An abbreviated translation of the 
typology follows:
The first period is consciously initiated by the smoker, and usually lasts a 
few months, though it can last many years . . .  he smokes increasing quantities 
with increasing frequency, but opium has not yet become a vital necessity to him. 
. . .  He smokes at set times or occasionally, and . . . gives an increasingly large 
role in his life to opium.
18 See footnote 10 for the system of weights in use at the time. As will be discussed later, modem scholarship 
suggests that this amount is "clearly" addictive.
19 Antoine de Mol van Otterloo, De Opiumschuiver in het Hospitaal: Een Proeve van Klinische Beschrijving 
(Utrecht: Kemink en Zoon N.V., 1933), p. 58.
20 Ibid., p. 43.
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Table 2: Opium addicts handled by the Netherlands Indies health system and total 
number o f opium users, 1932-1940
Year
Addicts
Handled
Total Number
+*
o f Users
Percentage o f  
*
Users Handled
1932 2,423 100,500 2.4%
1933 1,681 99,400 1.7%
1934 1,540 83,900 1.8%
1935 1,059 74,800 1.4%
1936 806 69,300 1.2%
1937 796 78,000 1.0%
1938 955 82,300 1.2%
1939 955 78,300 1.2%
1940 1,052 77,300 1.4%
Source: Opium Reports, 1932-1940.
+Total number of users rounded to the nearest 100.
*
The figure in Column 3 understates the actual number of users. It was common for licensed 
indigenous buyers to illegally distribute opium to other unlicensed users. For the same reason, the 
figures in Column 4 overstate the percentages of users in the hospital system.
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The second period, in which he is definitely an opium user,21 is of very uneven 
length . . .  from five months to fifty years. The time almost never comes when this 
user frees himself from opium . . .  [T]he association with opium is lifelong, and 
their lives are considerably shortened by the use of opium.
Over time, a relatively small fraction of the users develop an aversion to 
opium, and attempt to break their association with it. This is the third period . . .  
the user turns to the hospital. . .  to resolve the conflict between his psychological 
aversion to and his physical dependence on opium.22
From the above account, it can be inferred that the numbers in Column 2 of Table 2 
refer primarily to the third type of user, or the most serious cases of addiction. They 
suggest, however, parallel consequences of the Depression for the second type of user, 
whose numbers were much larger.23
Van Otterloo's account is interesting for a second reason, namely the difference 
between users in the first and second periods. Economic models of addiction have 
been designed to conform to the observation that there exist different "types" of users 
of addictive substances.24 These models predict, in particular, the existence of a low- 
intensity user-type, who is flexible in his consumption habits in comparison to a 
second user-type, the high-intensity user. In this view of addiction, a distinguishing 
feature of the intense consumer is his tendency, in response to a change in price or 
income, to either continue consuming at previous levels or completely stop consuming 
the addictive substance. Less-intense consumers, on the other hand, tend to adjust the 
quantities that they consume in response to changes in prices and incomes. Because the 
data from the Opium Regie are quite detailed and reliable, they can be used to test the 
predictions of this body of theory.
Table 3 (below) is a characterization of the two official population groups for 
whom data on opium consumption were collected.25 As a population, the Chinese
21 The Dutch word, "opiumschuiver," conveys the sense of a regular user rather than that of a casual user.
22 Van Otterloo, De Opiumschuiver, p. 43.
23 This first-hand description is in stark contrast to the conclusion in Jan C. Van Ours, "The Price 
Elasticity of Hard Drugs: The Case of Opium in the Dutch East Indies, 1923-1938," Journal of Political 
Economy 103,2 (1995): 278, that opium was "not very addictive."
24 See, for example, Gary S. Becker and Kevin M. Murphy, "A Theory of Rational Addiction," Journal of 
Political Economy 96 (August 1988): 675-700.
25 The two groups are the indigenous people and the Foreign Asiatics, the majority of whom were Chinese. 
The results of the 1920 census of the Netherlands Indies suggest that the Chinese outnumbered other Asians 
in the Foreign Asiatics category by a ratio of about 9:1 on average. To be exact, in Java and Madura, there 
were 384,218 Chinese and 27,806 Arabs, accounting for 92.5 percent and 6.7 percent of the Foreign Asiatics 
category respectively. The equivalent figures for the Outer Islands were 425,429 Chinese (92.3 percent) and 
17,115 Arabs (3.7 percent). These figures were reported in later editions of the Koloniale Verslagen, such as 
the 1931 edition, pp. 34-35. Full citation: Department van Zaken Oversee, Verslag van Bestuur en Stoat van 
Nederlandsch-Indie over het Jaar 1931 (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1931). For simplicity, and in accordance 
with standard statistical practice, Foreign Asiatics will be referred to as Chinese. Interestingly, in Van 
Ours, "The Price Elasticity," cost of living figures for the indigenous people are used to analyze data on the 
Chinese, when the relevant cost of living data for the Chinese (provided under the category "Foreign 
Asiatics") are provided in the same source. This renders the analysis of the Chinese data in that study 
incorrect.
Table 3 : A characterization o f opium users in the Netherlands Indies, 1923-1940
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Chinese Indigenous
Mean Consumption (Intensity) 633 g/yr 188 g/yr
Responsiveness to Price* -0.93 -0.87
% of Price Response Due to 
Change in Intensity
54% 71%
% of Price Response Due to 
Number of Users
46% 29%
Responsiveness to Income* 1.99 1.06
% of Income Response Due to 
Change in Intensity
59% 90%
% of Income Response Due to 
Number of Users
41% 10%
Source: Mean consumption, from Opium Reports, various. Responsiveness estimates, from Siddharth Chandra, 
“The Great Depression, Cold Turkey, and the Price and Income Elasticities of a Hard Drug: Opium Consumption 
in the Netherlands Indies,” (Pittsburgh: Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of 
Pittsburgh, February 2000. GSPIA Working Paper PIA 015), Table 5, p.25.
* These numbers are elasticities, as defined earlier in the text.
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were clearly more intense consumers than their indigenous comrades.26 To quote Rush 
in the context of the Chinese users, " . . .  most of the severest addicts then . . . appear 
to have been the Chinese . . . "27 The mean of per-user opium consumption for the 
Chinese was 634 grams per year.28 At a conservatively low morphine content of ten 
percent, this translates to 63.4 grams or 63,400 milligrams (mg.) of morphine per 
year.29 Averaged over 365 days, this gives a daily per capita consumption of 173.69 
mg. of morphine. This is almost three times the amount that is "clearly" addictive.30 
We also know that morphine is used today as a pain-killer for patients with advanced 
cancers and other severely painful ailments. For example, the standard handbook for 
physicians in the US today mentions a standard intravenous dosage of ten mg. every 
four hours, for a total of sixty mg. per day.31 Physical dependence on the drug resulting 
from prolonged use is widely recognized, and addiction generally sets in rapidly.32 To 
quote the UNDCP, "sought-after effects" include a "sense of well being by reducing 
tension, anxiety and depression; euphoria, in large doses warmth, contentment, 
relaxed detachment from emotional as well as physical distress," and "relief from pain 
(analgesia)."33 "Long-term effects" include, among a host of other things, "rapid 
development of tolerance and physical and psychological dependence" and, in the 
case of "abrupt withdrawal," "moderate to severe withdrawal syndrome which is 
generally comparable to a bout of influenza (with cramps, diarrhea, running nose, 
tremors, panic, chills, and sweating, etc.)."34 Keeping in mind the fact that inhaled 
morphine is about as bio-available (efficiently absorbed) as intravenously introduced 
morphine, modem medical standards suggest that 173.69 mg. of inhaled morphine per 
day will very likely "hook" a person over the course of a few weeks, let alone an entire 
year. Given this evidence, it is safe to infer that addiction to opium must have been a
26 In terms of numbers of users, in 1923, the first year for which official numbers of users are available, 
there were 14,393 users in Java and Madura, and 42,287 users in the Outer Islands. As a fraction of the 
Chinese population in 1920, the closest year for which these data are available, these translate to 3.75 
percent for Java and Madura and 9.94 percent for the Outer Islands.
27 Rush, Opium to Java, p. 29.
28 This was computed by using region-year observations of per-user consumption for the period 1923-1940 
for twenty-two regions of the Netherlands Indies.
29 This is an approximation. For studies of the content of opium in the Netherlands Indies, see J. Haak, 
Opiumregie met normaal-tjandoe (Samarang: G.C.T. van Dorp, 1889), pp. 15,53, and Bijlage A, p. 58, and Tj.
J. Addens, De verspreiding van de opium cultuur en de handel in opium (The spread of opium cultivation and 
opium trade) (Haarlem: Joh. Enschede en zonen, 1939), for example.
30 See John C. Kramer, "Speculations on the Nature and Patterns of Opium Smoking," Journal of Drug Issues 
(Spring 1979): 247-255, as quoted in Rush, Opium to Java, p. 38. The daily level considered to be "clearly" 
addictive is 60 mg, while levels of 20-30 mg. are "mildly" addictive.
31 See Kurt J. Isselbacher, Eugene Braunwald, Jean D. Wilson, Joseph B. Martin, Anthony S. Fauci, and 
Joseph B. Martin eds., Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine: Companion Handbook (New York:
McGraw Hill, February 1994,13th edition), Tablesl-2, p. 3.
32 For a brief but informative description of opium and opiates, see the United Nations International Drug 
Control Program (UNDCP), at h ttp ://193.81.61.210/. and especially the files on opium, at 
http://193.81.61.210/adhoc/terminology and information on drugs/. For the purposes of this study, 
the most relevant files are "opium-l.htm" to "opium-6.htm."
33UNDCP,http://193.81.61.210/adhoc/terminology and information on drugs/opium-5.htm.
34 UNDCP, ibid.
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serious issue for the Chinese. The corresponding calculation35 for the indigenous users 
yields a daily morphine consumption of 51.51 mg., which is between the "mildly" and 
"clearly" addictive levels.
Opium Smoker.
Source: Postcard by G. Kolff and Company, Batavia, circa 1920. Photographer unknown. 
From an image scanned by Anton Stikkelman.
Using statistical methods, it is possible to examine the effects of changes in the 
price of opium on the consumption of opium.36 This is done by computing a price 
elasticity, which is an estimate of the percentage change in consumption of opium in 
response to a 1 percent rise in price. In Table 3, we see that populations of Chinese 
and indigenous users responded to a 1 percent increase in the price of opium by 
reducing their aggregate consumption by 0.93 percent and 0.87 percent respectively. It
35 This is derived from a region-year mean per capita consumption of 188 grams of opium.
36 For details of the methods used, see Siddharth Chandra, "The Great Depression, Cold Turkey, and the 
Price and Income Elasticities of a Hard Drug: Opium Consumption in the Netherlands Indies," Graduate 
School of Public and International Affairs, Working Paper No. PIA015, University of Pittsburgh, February 
2000. Located at http://www.pitt.edu/~wpseries.
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is also possible to apportion this elasticity into responses due to changes in intensity 
of consumption (i.e., how much users adjusted their levels of consumption in response 
to the change in price) and changes in numbers of users (i.ev how much of the aggregate 
change in opium consumption was due to users leaving or entering the market for 
opium). As the theory predicts, the more intense Chinese populations showed a 
relatively smaller (54 percent of the total response) intensity response than did the 
less-intense indigenous smokers (71 percent). The responses to changes in incomes 
strengthen this finding. The income elasticity, which is an estimate of the percentage 
change in consumption of opium in response to a 1 percent rise in income, shows that, 
for the indigenous users, 90 percent of the income response in aggregate consumption 
was due to intensity adjustments. The corresponding figure for the Chinese was only 
59 percent. In sum, these findings support some of the predictions of economic theories 
of addiction. More importantly for the purpose of this study, they suggest that the 
consumption of opium was quite sensitive to changes in price and income. Because the 
Great Depression was one such episode, this raises a key question about the decline of 
the Opium Regie—was it a triumph of enlightened drug policy, as seems to be the 
implication of recent economic research, or was it a historical accident, brought about 
by the ravages of inflation (1920-1923) and the Great Depression (1929-1936)?
The Decline of Opium Consumption: Policy Triumph or Historical Accident?
There are two schools of thought on the motives underlying the Opium Regie. The 
first school, exemplified in the work of Rush, one of the few non-Dutch scholars to 
have worked on the Opium Regie, views the Ethical rhetoric of the Regie as being 
inconsistent with its actions.37 These actions, it is argued, reveal a predominantly 
commercial motive underlying the operation of the Opium Regie. The second school, 
which includes the work of Jan C. van Ours, attributes substantial credibility to Regie 
rhetoric.38 This school interprets the actions and outcomes of the Regie as being 
consistent with its stated Ethical goal: namely, the reduction, if not eradication, of the 
opium problem.
37 See Rush, Opium to Java, "The Opium Regie and Ethical Java," Chapter 11, pp. 217-241. For a 
comparative study of drug policy in colonial Southeast Asia, see Foster, "Prohibition as Superiority."
38 See, for example, Van Ours, "The Price Elasticity,"pp. 261-279; Eric W. van Luijk and Jan C. van Ours, 
"On the determinants of opium consumption: an empirical analysis of historical data," CentER Discussion 
Paper No. 9863, Tilburg University, June 1998; and Eric W. van Luijk and Jan C. van Ours, "How 
Government Policy Affects the Consumption of Hard Drugs: The Case of Opium in Java, 1873-1907," 
CentER Discussion Paper No. 9865, Tilburg University, June 1998, forthcoming in the Journal of Economic 
History. In this third paper, the authors use data from two different regimes, the opium-farm system and the 
early Opium Regie, to show that the "change in government policy had a substantial negative effect on 
opium consumption" (Abstract, p. 1). Apart from the essential incomparability of the data across these two 
regimes, the study ignores the fact that by 1914, the annual consumption of high morphine-content opium 
was at the 100,000 kilograms per year level at which low morphine-content opium was being consumed in 
the 1870s, and well above the 60,000 kilograms per year level at which this diluted opium was being 
consumed in the years just prior to the transition to the Opium Regie. The main policy implication of that 
study, that controlled legalization leads to a decline in consumption, does not, therefore, follow from the 
analysis.
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The characterization of the Opium Regie in Van Ours, "Price Elasticity," leads the 
reader to believe that the Regie operated in the sole interest of the subjects of the 
Netherlands Indies.39 In this section, the contradictions between this view and that of 
Rush will be explained. The findings of this study are, furthermore, consistent with 
Rush's view of the early Regie; the Regie continued to operate like a profit-maximizing 
monopolist in the market for an addictive good. This point has been entirely neglected 
in the preceding economic analyses of the Opium Regie.
Because this section seeks to interpret the actions of the Opium Regie, it is 
important to characterize the behavior of the Regie as it pertains to the pricing and sale 
of opium. In the years following the inception of the Opium Regie, opium in the 
Netherlands Indies was the most expensive opium in the world. According to Rush, it 
was sold for about ten times the price of opium in Singapore in 1903.40 Official Dutch 
policy claimed that this high price was imposed in order to restrict opium consumption 
in the Netherlands Indies for ethical reasons. A sense of ethical responsibility was not, 
however, the overriding reason for the prolonged existence of the Regie. During the 
heated debates on the pros and cons of the opium-farm system, debates which took 
place during the 1880s and after, the most influential report on the subject of the 
policy implications of a new Regie arrangement, the Groeneveldt report, took a 
commercial approach to the opium question. The author recommended that (a) the 
supply of opium not be artificially restricted, (b) the state ensure, using an efficient 
land- and marine-based enforcement system, that smuggling offer no competition to 
the government product, and (c) that the government sell the opium at a high fixed 
price to users. The high prices, it was suggested, would discourage addiction, but this 
beneficial effect was mentioned more as a by-product of the central profit-maximizing 
goal. As Rush asserts, the Groeneveldt report
. . . offered the hope that the Netherlands might enjoy its opium revenues even 
more abundantly without the farms and without the Chinese. The Groeneveldt 
report irrevocably tilted opinion within the government in the direction of a 
regie.41
More telling than the principles of the Regie, however, were its actions. Van Ours, 
writing on the establishment of the Regie, states that
[I]f opium smoking was almost absent, the sale of legal opium — if there was any 
— was stopped, and the use of opium was actually forbidden 42
On the other hand, Rush uses the case of the large Priangan residency in West Java to 
demonstrate that while
[T]he Forbidden Areas had been a hallowed part of the opium farm system to 
which the Dutch had pointed for years as evidence of their good intentions vis-a- 
vis opium . . .  [M]uch to the consternation of those who viewed the Opium Regie
39 A substantial portion of that paper is devoted to discussion of the Opium Regie, its goals, and the 
historical context of the subsequent analysis. See, for example, Van Ours, "Price Elasticity," pp. 262-268, 
271, 273.
4(1 Rush, Opium to Java, p. 226.
41 Ibid., p. 210.
42 Van Ours, "Price Elasticity," p. 266.
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as an Ethical43 vehicle for the gradual elimination of opium smoking, regie 
officials dismantled several of Java's Forbidden Areas.44
Van Ours suggests that the official principles of the Opium Regie were translated into 
action, as in
Not only was the licensing and registration system applied to curtail the number 
of opium users, it was also used to limit the amount of opium that users 
consumed. The quantities sold in the opium shops of the state were limited in 
size. Users were not permitted to buy more than once a d a y . . . 45
On the other hand, Rush, drawing on detailed archival research, states
. . . [T]he VOC46 spirit had survived the Ethical gale. When sales declined or 
failed to equal those of the preceding farm, officials went to great lengths to 
justify the falling revenues. When sales increased, reports became jubilant. It 
occurred to no one to apologize for the boom or to consider measures to reverse 
the trend.47
Rush also quotes an anonymous official in The Hague, who wrote
Reading this report makes one despair for the working of the Regie—there is no 
indication whatsoever that anyone strives to reduce the use of opium.48
In practice, the generation of revenues and profits seems to have been the major 
concern of officials of the Regie, even in its early days.
Having demonstrated the extreme profitability of the Opium Regie in a previous 
section, I will now examine, from the perspective of an economist, its key policy 
actions, including changes in price and licensing policy. The exercise of these policy 
options reveals a pattern consistent with the behavior of a profit-maximizing 
monopolist in the market for an addictive good, a point that has not been made in a 
literature dominated by Dutch scholarship. While aspects of these actions are also 
consistent with the more charitable Dutch interpretation (i.e., the goal of eradication of 
opium consumption), a number of facts do not square with that view.
The Economics of the Opium Regie: The Profit Interpretation
A fundamental characteristic of the Opium Regie was the monopolistic nature of 
the system. The overt argument for this was the elimination of the trade in smuggled 
opium, which was seen to be of lower quality than processed Regie opium. Once the 
monopoly had been established and smuggling controlled, it was argued, the Regie
43 The word "Ethical" refers to the Ethical period in the history of Indonesia, described earlier.
44 Rush, Opium to Java, p. 235.
45 Van Ours, "Price Elasticity," p. 267.
46 VOC is the acronym for Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (the United (Dutch) East India Company), 
which represented the initial and explicitly commercial Dutch interest in what is now Indonesia.
47 Rush, Opium to Java, p. 235.
48 Ibid., p. 241.
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would turn its attention inward to the eradication of legal opium consumption.49 The 
government was supposed to use strong anti-smuggling measures to enforce this 
general policy. To determine the commitment of the Opium Regie to the anti-smuggling 
effort, we need to turn to the accounts of the Opium Regie.
Table 4 (below) provides a sample balance sheet for the Regie for the year 1925, 
showing the various cost components. In addition to purchasing processed opium from 
the factory in Batavia (now Jakarta), the Regie was responsible for the packing, 
transportation, and distribution of opium, along with other activities such as drug 
enforcement. For this reason, the final cost of opium included, in addition to the cost 
of processed opium itself, a number of additional items. Interestingly, a small fraction 
(at 4.2 percent in 1925, for example) of total cost was allocated to anti-smuggling 
activities. This allocation was even lower as a fraction of the revenues (at 0.9 percent) 
or profits (at 1.2 percent) of the Regie, which could, presumably, have been allocated 
by an Ethically minded organization to the eradication of the problem. What is more, 
the reason for this relatively small allocation was economic and had nothing to do with 
the ideal of eliminating smuggling, even when there was plenty of room in the budget to 
attempt this. As Rush says, " . . .  by 1903 it was already the consensus that to 
intercept completely the flow of illegal opium into Java would require exorbitant 
expenditures."50 So, rather than attempt to achieve its stated goal, perhaps by plowing 
some of its millions of Guilders of opium profits into the eradication of smuggling, the 
Regie chose to keep the sizable proceeds as profit, ensuring the perpetuation of the 
problem and the consequent continuing profitable market for the legal drug.
A second characteristic of the Opium Regie was the price policy. The idea was to 
maintain a high price, ostensibly to discourage consumption. The Dutch school points 
to this as evidence of the sincerity of the Regie with respect to its stated goals.51 What 
it fails to acknowledge is the fact that a high price is also consistent with the behavior 
of a profit-maximizing monopolist. To the degree that the monopolist controls the 
market, it will raise the price of its product well above the cost of producing it, 
generating large profits. In fact, economic theory predicts a specific relationship 
between the price of the product and a measure of the cost of producing the good, if 
the producer is trying to maximize profits.52 In the simplest of frameworks, the theory 
predicts that the proportion of the price that is the mark-up over the marginal cost will 
be close to 1 if the producer is behaving like a profit-maximizing monopolist and has
49 As Rush states, "All of this [growth in sales of Regie opium] was good, and Ethical, because it helped 
snuff out the illegal trade in cheap — and, as the Dutch hastened to insist, inferior — opium. Only when the 
regie commanded the market could the vice tax principles on which it and the farm were based have any 
effect." Ibid., p. 235
50 Ibid., p. 230.
51 See, for example, discussion of the "rigorous" use in 1920-1921 of the "severe price policy" claimed in 
Van Ours, "Price Elasticity," p. 266. As discussed earlier, this was a rise in the money price brought about 
partly in response to a general rise in prices during the bad harvest years of 1920 and 1921. In "real" terms 
(i.e., in comparison to the prices of other goods), which is the correct economic measure of price, the price of 
opium actually fell during this time.
52 The measure of cost is the marginal cost of production. This is the cost incurred in order to produce one 
additional unit of output, in this case a specific amount of processed opium.
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Table 4: Sample Balance Sheet for the Opium Regie (for the year 1925/
Revenue
Total revenue from sales /  36,620,501.36
Value of the opium returned to the opium /  2,918.60
factory on account of leakage or other defect 
Total revenue from sales /  36,623,419.96
Cost
Cost of sold opium /  5,074,871.87
Cost of djitjing $ /  100,855.00
Wages and salaries of directorate and /  136,865.39
inspectorate staff in the head office 
Other wages and salaries paid for /  1,527,657.41
work done for the Regie 
Transportation and living expenses for /  67,024.90
Regie personnel
Transportation cost of opium, djitjing % /  176,852.92
money, and packing materials 
Printing, office materials, packing materials, /  34,862.02
lighting, and similar costs 
Rent and maintenance of buildings /  212,455.60
Payment to the Marine Department for the use /  217,761.00
of steamships in anti-smuggling operations 
Cost of land-based anti-smuggling operations, /  117,530.00
including payments for seized contraband 
Pensions, reduced pay, unemployment benefits etc. /  235,197.00
(15% of total salaries and wages, plus reduced 
pay for discharged superfluous personnel) 
Total cost /  7,901,933.11
Net profit of the Opium Regie /  28,721,486.85
Source: Verslag betreffende den Dienst der Opwmregie, 1925, Bijlage No. 3, p. 36.
•(•Figures are in current Guilders.
% Djitjing was the residual substance, or opium dross, left after opium was smoked. Because o f its morphine 
content, this substance was recycled as an input into processed opium.
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substantial monopoly power. In other words, most of the price of the good is the 
profit-margin. In the case of the Regie, this number is close to 1 by empirical economic 
standards, suggesting profit-maximizing behavior by a monopolist.
A second specific prediction relating to the behavior of the Opium Regie has to do 
with the price-elasticity (or price-responsiveness) of consumption presented in Table 3. 
Economic theory predicts that a profit-maximizing monopolist will price his product 
such that the price-elasticity for that product is close to, but less than, -1 in value (for 
example, -1.20). In the specific case of an addictive good, however, the monopolist will 
lower his price so that the price-elasticity is greater than -1 (-0.95, for example). The 
reason for this is that, in selling an addictive good, it is in the interest of a monopolist 
to lower the price to attract consumers, because the long-term benefit to him of having 
additional addicted consumers outweighs the short-term loss from lowering the price 
below what he would charge if the good were not addictive.53 In the case of the Opium 
Regie, the price elasticities for the Chinese and indigenous users are greater than -1. 
This is consistent with profit-maximizing behavior by a monopolist in the market for 
an addictive good.
As a final note on the effects of price on opium consumption, it is ironic that the 
only situations in which high prices actually reduced consumption were not of the 
making of the Regie—they were the two shocks discussed previously, brought about by 
circumstances entirely external to the Opium Regie. In addition, the first price shock 
actually resulted in a drop in the "real" price of opium, suggesting that the 
contemporaneous rise in the general price level was responsible for that decline in 
opium consumption.
A third policy feature of the Opium Regie was the system of licensing and 
registration of users. This system was supposed to restrict the consumption of opium 
to a controlled group of users, with the ostensible goal of phasing out consumption in 
the long run, Purchases by users were supposed to be limited in frequency and size.54 
As was discussed earlier, during the period under consideration, the licensing policy 
underwent one major change. This was the relaxation, in 1927, of the licensing 
requirements. This step was taken in response to a rise in smuggling activity. Its effects 
are visible in the steep increase in the numbers of "unlicensed" users in that year, 
especially in the Outer Islands areas close to Singapore, such as Oostkust van Sumatra 
and Riouw. Rather than act decisively, using some of its sizable profits to thwart 
smuggling, the Opium Regie behaved like a cost-conscious monopoly that is threatened 
by the entry of a competitor into the market — it made it easier for consumers to buy 
its own product.55 The budget for anti-smuggling enforcement, on the other hand,
53 See Gary Fethke and Raj Jagannathan, "Habit Persistence, Heterogeneous Tastes, and Imperfect 
Competition," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 20,6-7 (June-July 1996): 1193-1207; and Gary S. 
Becker, Michael Grossman, and Kevin M. Murphy, "An Empirical Analysis of Cigarette Addiction," 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 3322, April 1990, pp. 28-33.
54 In fact, as is pointed out in Foster, "Prohibition as Superiority," p. 267, the policy had mixed success, at 
best.
55As with its other questionable actions, there was a convenient excuse for increases in the size of the 
market for Regie opium. To quote Rush, writing on the early Regie period, " . . .  for those who may have been 
embarrassed to explain regie profit-consciousness in terms of Dutch greed, there was an Ethical rationale. If 
the regie sold less than the farm had done, the black market must be expanding. Any growth in regie sales. . .
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stayed fairly constant, a clear sign that allocating additional money from the profits of 
the Opium Regie to the eradication of the problem was not high on the policy agenda.
Conclusion
In this paper, the causes and nature of the decline between 1914 and 1940 of the 
Opium Regie in the Netherlands Indies were examined. Contrary to the gist of some 
recent scholarship from the Netherlands, which echoes the denials that typify some of 
the writings of the Regie period described in Rush's Opium to Java and elsewhere, I 
have argued that conscious government policy had little if anything to do with any 
decline in opium consumption.56 The statistical data, a good indicator of the actions of 
the Opium Regie, show that Rush's conclusions about the early years of the Opium 
Regie remain valid for its later years. By way of extension of that work, it has been 
shown, first, that the fall in opium consumption was driven by two economic events 
whose origins were entirely external to the Opium Regie. These were the inflation of 
1919-1922 and the Great Depression of 1929-1935. In contemporaneous accounts of 
opium smokers, and in the quantitative characterization of the responses of opium 
consumers to these events, evidence can be found of addictive behavior, negating a 
second conclusion in the economic literature about the non-addictive nature of opium. 
The response of the intense Chinese users as a group was driven to a larger degree by 
the number of drop-outs than was the response of the less intense indigenous users. 
The policy actions of the Opium Regie with respect to price, enforcement, and licensing 
were shown to be consistent with the behavior of a profit-maximizing monopolist in 
the market for an addictive good. The attitude of the Regie toward the opium problem 
and its consequences for Indies subjects are well-expressed in the description of an 
addict in a recently published memoir of an Indies citizen of the time:
Koki had another very bad habit, which was more or less condoned by the 
government at that time, because it brought in a tidy sum of money in extra tax 
. . . Koki was addicted to opium . . . She would . . . hold [an opium pipe] over 
the flame, inhaling greedily. Then I would notice her eyes closing, rolling back in a 
half-dream, and she would lay there motionless . . . Koki threw away her hard- 
earned money that way . . .  57
In the final analysis, Indonesia has the Great Depression, and not the Opium Regie, 
to thank for the decline of opium consumption in the years prior to her independence.
could be explained in terms of bringing a once clandestinely fed market into the orbit of the Opium Regie." 
Rush, Opium to Java, p. 235
56 For an example of denial during the Regie period, see Mineke Bosch's description of Aletta Jacob's 
reaction to the opium factory in Batavia, in Mineke Bosch, "Colonial Dimensions of Dutch Women's 
Suffrage: Aletta Jacob's Travel Letters from Africa and Asia, 1911-1912," Journal of Women’s History 11,2 
(Summer 1999): 8-34.
57 Marguerite Schenkhuizen, Memoirs of an Indo Woman: Twentieth-Century Life in the East Indies and 
Abroad, trans. Lizelot Stout van Balgooy (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 
Southeast Asia Series No. 92,1993), pp. 33-34.

